Introduction
The successful second referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon (Lisbon II) 1 in Ireland in October 2009 finally brought the Irish Government some respite from European Union affairs. The process of the first failed referendum in 2008 (Lisbon I) and then the extensive political campaign to ratify the Treaty a second time around brought with it a tremendous period of reflection, not merely for the Irish State but also for institutional actors, scholars and civil society alike. Many recommendations were made in this period by this broad church to reform Irish "European affairs," by re-evaluating fundamental and broad-ranging themes such as the government referendum spending rules, referendum broadcasting rules, and the role of the Oireachtas (Irish Parliament) in European Union affairs generally.
2 Thus, the prolonged and tense period of crisis and reflection over a two-year period brought with it an institutionalized "think-in" as to European Union membership incomparable to any previous time in Irish history. Yet despite the long and extensive period of reflection between Lisbon I and Lisbon II, what is notable is that the Irish relationship with the European Union's former Third Pillar, its future participation in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, the Irish Schengen Protocol arrangements and Irish-British relations in a European Union context did not receive anything that could be called substantive coverage in this period.
The Irish Government commissioned research on the negative public vote on Lisbon I, and from the findings distinct trends were discernable concerning class and gender in voting patterns. Ultimately, many respondents pointed to an information deficit. 3 The militarization of the European Union was a particular matter of concern to voters, and the issue was included in the Guarantees provided in 2009 by the Heads of State or Government of the European Union to assist the Irish Government in obtaining a successful result in the second referendum. 4 Importantly, the relationship between public opinion and Irish participation in Justice and Home Affairs, the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, and its opt-out from the Schengen Area did not -according to the research -provoke the negative referendum result. A fragile outsider stance of "opt-out/opt-in" post-Lisbon now characterizes the Irish relationship with the entire Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, in the form of Protocols and Declarations as contained in the Treaty of Lisbon. The background to this situation, in tandem with the Treaty of Lisbon revisions to the Schengen Protocol and the general context of "Irish(-British)-Euro relations" and European Union law, forms the subject of analysis here.
"British-Irish" relations, the usual alphabetical and legal 5 formula employed to consider matters of policy between the two States, is intentionally inverted here with a view to critically tracing Irish law and policy on specific European Union issues after the Treaty of Lisbon. The elision of the two States in the title of this article and the interconnecting symbol separated by brackets are employed here as a metaphor for the complexities associated with this interconnection. Thus, the focus of this paper is on Irish-British relations and their 5. See, for example, the Belfast Agreement, the peace agreement concluded on Good Friday in 1998 heralding a new era of peace in Northern Ireland, which contained two elements, one of which is entitled the British-Irish Agreement, an international agreement between the Irish and British States, implemented by the North-South Ministerial Council, a British-Irish Intergovernmental conference and the British-Irish Council. The Belfast Agreement is also known as the Good Friday Agreement and the British-Irish Agreement. See also the Irish legislation passed to give effect to the Belfast Agreement, the British-Irish Agreement Acts 1999 and 2002. Thus the term "British-Irish relations" is deeply ingrained in this usual linguistic sense as a matter of law and politics.
impact on Irish policies in a European context and the resulting legal provisions, namely the Common Travel Area between the States and the "special arrangements" provided for in the the Schengen Protocol and the special Protocols on Ireland and the UK of the Treaty of Amsterdam.
It is suggested here that the far-reaching Irish policy opt-out/opt-ins obtained in the Treaty of Lisbon do not amount to a systematic "better bargain" obtained as regards European Union affairs, but rather are the strange and unacknowledged outcome of Irish-British relations to date. Water borders and the Common Travel Area are unduly significant in accounts of "Irish-(British)-Euro" relations up to now, and a more complex set of variables provides an explanation of this phenomenon. The increased flexibility accorded to Ireland and the UK in the Treaty of Lisbon seems almost disproportionate to its effectiveness as a matter of European Union constitutional law, where variable geometry has largely been a failure in legal terms. The contention of the present author is that the assumed similarities of the positions in law and policy of the two States in European matters fails to take into account constitutional peculiarities relevant to the Irish State, and that major issues as a matter of domestic law and not European law surround the future successful operation of the Protocols, Declarations and Guarantees recently obtained by Ireland. It is also argued here that the operation of these Protocols, Declarations and Guarantees is intrinsically dependent on the future decisions of the British Government as to the Common Travel Area, the Treaty of Lisbon Transitional Provisions, and its remaining outside the Schengen Area.
The article is organized as follows: Irish-British relations as to law, policy and litigation are firstly assessed here, followed by an outline of the operation of the Common Travel Area between Ireland and the UK. The evolution of the special arrangements for Ireland and the UK under, in particular, the Schengen Protocol is then traced. The recent decisions of the Court of Justice on this Protocol are considered, followed by an analysis of the Protocols, Declarations and Guarantees obtained by Ireland in order to ratify the Treaty of Lisbon, as well as a revised Schengen Protocol and an opt-out/opt-in as to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Finally, the constitutional changes made to Bunreacht na héireann (t he Irish Constitution) so as to allow the Treaty of Lisbon to take effect in domestic law are assessed, in light of the Protocols, Declarations and Guarantees obtained.
Irish-British relations and their impact on Irish policies to the European Union

Background
An attempt is made here firstly to consider briefly the similarities and differences between Irish and British relations with the European Union, from the points of view of law, policy and litigation. The outward indicators of "Irish-British" relations at European Union level as a matter of law and policy point to an Irish entity riding on the coattails of the British Government. 6 The reasons commonly asserted for the close relations in law and politics in European Union affairs typically refer to the Common Travel Area between Ireland and the UK and the common law tradition shared by the two States.
7 However, the relationship of the UK with the European Union is often depicted as awkward or troubled, earning itself a reputation as "the European Union's trickiest customer." 8 This label is not however used by commentators referring to the Irish State when describing its European Union credentials. The unsuccessful Nice I and Lisbon I referenda aside, the Irish electorate has been broadly in favour of the European Union according to decades of Eurobarometer polls, unlike the British electorate. 9 As to policy, similar to the UK and throughout many decades of European Union membership since accession, Irish concerns expressed in the lead-in to the adoption of the Constitutional Treaty (and to a lesser extent the Treaty of Lisbon, discussed here) related to tax harmonization, foreign policy and some aspects of Justice and Home Affairs, and they continue now to be areas of sensitivity, with Ireland maintaining a need for unanimity, although this position is rarely antagonistic and is usually rooted in the UK policy position. 10 The failures of the Nice I and Lisbon I referenda have been portrayed in a variety of ways. Such portrayals, however, do not posit Euro-scepticism on the part of the Irish State or its people or relate it to Irish-British relations.
As to legal matters, Ireland of course shares a common law heritage with the UK for historical reasons but, unlike the UK, has had a strong constitutional tradition since 1937, having a written Constitution which accords express powers of judicial review to the judiciary. The Irish judiciary is overwhelmingly pro-Community. Key legal doctrines of European Union law regarding, for example, supremacy and direct effect -well-established from the outset of Irish membership of the EEC (as it then was) at the same time as the UK in 1973 -were embraced earlier and more readily than amongst the British judiciary and almost half of the Irish Supreme Court bench, including the Chief Justice, have served as former member of the Court of Justice in Luxembourg.
11
In the past, many UK legislative measures have been transposed into Irish law, particularly in the area of criminal law and, more controversially, in recent times relating to the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights.
12
There are some who suggest that the continued Irish support for British policies in European affairs during the UK Blair Government years was to the detriment of Ireland, at the expense of developing ongoing links and strategic alliances in policy and practices with Continental countries. 13 Moreover, it is asserted that there has been a continual "drift" by the main Irish Government party, Fianna Fáil, in power continuously for over a decade to the present day, 14 towards closer association with Britain, entailing that it is now necessary to avoid feeding renewed continental suspicions that Ireland is a veritable " British Prior to examining the Treaty of Lisbon changes -the real subject of analysis in this article -the Common Travel Area is first considered, given that it is the perceived basis for the Irish and British special arrangements in the Schengen Protocol and the special Protocols on Ireland and the UK.
The Common Travel Area between Ireland and the UK as the basis for the arrangements in the Schengen Protocol
The Common Travel Area between Ireland and the UK is arguably the most important explanatory factor of Irish policy choices in European affairs affecting in particular its landmass and borders. 23 The Common Travel Area has its origins subsequent to the creation of the Irish Free State in 1922, when it became classed as a dominion, where previously Aliens Law had been enforced at Irish ports as in the UK. 24 Thus, upon the establishment of the Free State, a passport system was not established between the two countries. The account of the origins of the Common Travel Area is well documented elsewhere; suffice it to say that it was administrative and extra-legal in its origins and operation, and was maintained by both countries for obviously pragmatic purposes without complications prior to the 1990s. 25 The Common Travel Area was of enormous importance in the context of Northern Irish relations with the Republic in the South, and to the operation of trade in all parts of the island and was a feature of social interchanges there. 28. See Ryan, op. cit. supra note 23, 874: "The success of the common travel area in the eighty years since the establishment of the Irish Free State has been due to a combination of factors… has been a pragmatic response by Britain and Ireland to the practical and political difficulties associated with an effective immigration frontier at the Irish border…" 29. Ibid. Certain airline carriers, such as Ryanair, operating a significant number of routes between the UK and Ireland, still require the production of a passport from citizens travelling within the Common Travel Area and have made no special concession for this since the advent of its online check-in system. See www.ryanair.com, "Travel Documentation." fears of terrorism. This would have resulted in passport controls on Irish citizens travelling to the UK. The potential impact on the Schengen Protocol, discussed below, of the abolition of the Common Travel Area would obviously have been dramatic. The expressed rationale for this unilateral review was essentially that, in light of dramatic increases in mobility, privileges bestowed on Common Travel Area nationals might be abused by others, for example, facilitating illegal immigration, crime, smuggling and tax evasion; it was perceived by some as leaving a critical gap in the intelligence picture. 30 Responses to the review of the Common Travel Area were commonly negative and thus adverse to its amendment and respondees cited travel delays, costs, burdens on airline carriers and the inadequacy of port and travel infrastructure as reasons for maintaining the status quo and not introducing passport controls.
31
Fears were also expressed by British Conservatives that changes to the Common Travel Area could have left Northern Irish citizens isolated, even requiring them to produce a passport to enter Great Britain from Northern Ireland.
32
The unilateral act of review was also portrayed with alarmist tones in the Irish media and was perceived as an insensitive attack on cordial and carefullyhoned, modern day British-Irish relations. The ultimate position reached of no change was met with relief. The challenges faced by land masses surrounded by waters in the context of joining the Schengen area are not, however, insurmountable. 34 There are various precedents involving, for example, Lithuania and Kalingrad; a special transit document system remains a possibility, as do the type of arrangements in place for Nordic citizens in Denmark. 35 Arguably, however, the impact of 
Schengen Protocol and the Irish (and UK)
36 arrangements: From Amsterdam to Lisbon
Background
As is well known, the Schengen Area Agreement is an awesome achievement, designed to remove border controls among the participating States. The Schengen Area covers 22 Member States (9 newer States and 13 existing States) and Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, and 400 million citizens. Ireland and the UK, however, have enjoyed the provisions of a generously negotiated opt-out opt-in from the Agreement since 1997, set out in the so-called Schengen Protocol (the full title being: Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union). In addition, two particular Protocols for both countries accompanied the Treaty of Amsterdam: the Protocol on the application of certain aspects of Article [14 EC] to the United Kingdom and to Ireland, concerning border controls (which actually refers to the Common Travel Area); and the Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland, which concerns the opt-out and opt-in for Title IV, the Area of Freedom is the fact that citizens of Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden are free to enter, reside, study and work in Denmark, outside the Schengen Area as it is, and they do not need a visa, residence or work permit. See also the special arrangements in place for Danish Nationality for the citizens of Nordic countries Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden: Danish immigration Ministry www.nyidanmark.dk/en-us/citizenship/danish_nationality/nordic_nationals.htm, (last visited 8 Jan. 2009).
36. Albeit that the analysis which follows here relates solely to the Irish position where possible.
Security and Justice. Remarkably, the Irish Parliament has never debated an Irish opt-in to the Schengen Area since its negotiated opt-out opt-in. 37 An Irish diplomat describing the protracted and fractious Irish negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Amsterdam, put the Common Travel Area between the two States as the primary reason for the provisions negotiated for the two States, and no more.
38 This is unquestionably the original motivation for the Protocol opt-outs obtained by Ireland. That the Schengen acquis now constitutes a costly and diffi cult condition of accession for new applicant Member States to the European underscores the historical anomaly that the opt-out arrangements represent.
39
From the Treaty of Amsterdam to the Treaty of Lisbon, the position had been that Ireland and the UK were not bound by the Schengen acquis incorporated into Community law by the Treaties but could opt-in to all or part of Schengen, subject to a decision in favour by the Council acting with unanimous approval of the Schengen Area States. 40 Ireland and the UK are obliged to participate in measures which build upon the Schengen acquis into which they have already opted. Co-extensively, a "lock-out" rule applied, where other Member State could refuse their participation in measures building upon measures into which they had not already opted, the subject of recent controversial decisions of the Court, discussed below. 41 Kuijper has indicated that there were those, particularly in the Commission, who would argue that the opt-in opt-out has had a particularly negative influence on Community law, especially on the scope and nature of certain Commission proposals. 42 The special position of the United Kingdom and Ireland is now acutely unusual and complex, yet there have been many who have suggested that the traditional "water borders" explanation for the British (and correlatively Irish) "apartness" from Schengen is not an insurmountable barrier and that a British (and by extension Irish) decision to join Schengen would not necessarily imply a set-back compared to the current system of border controls. 43 was repeatedly asked to join the Schengen Area, prior to the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon. 44 Accounts of the special arrangements rarely attribute "apartness" to the Irish State but rather to the UK and the narrative depicting the State actors is dramatically one-sided in this regard.
The lexicon of the Irish and UK "special arrangements" in the Amsterdam Protocols
The literature on the Protocol arrangements for the UK and Ireland is extensive 45 and is replete with expressions that often do not find currency in legal articles. This is arguably because the Schengen Agreement and the Amsterdam Protocols form a legal expression of a political compromise, one asserted to be so difficult now that it has reached the point that it no longer works properly. The Protocol arrangements are thus described as "special", "alarming," "fiendishly complicated" and "bizarre" 46 and the inherent complexity of the canvas that is the Schengen acquis is described almost amusingly (unintentionally) by one commentator as "mysterious law" 47 and by others as a "clever … perhaps too clever piece of drafting." 48 Undoubtedly, then, negative overtones have been manifest in more recent times as to "Schengen law," disengaging it from its substantive meaning -being truly free movement -as there are now many human rights objections registered about the Agreement and its operation generally, the discussion of which is outside the scope of this work generally. 49 The point made here, however, is that the unusual lexicon which it has 47. As Kuijper notes, op. cit. supra note 44, a key phrase employed in the Schengen Protocol so as to permit an opt-in is that the measure to which the UK or Ireland wishes to opt-in must be "building upon" the Schengen acquis, albeit that it was unknown what "the mysterious category of subjects building upon the Schengen acquis" in fact was. This phrase, "building upon," has now been subjected to an interpretation by the Court of Justice that excludes the participation of Ireland and the UK, discussed in section 4 infra. generated compounds myths and reinforces public misunderstandings over European Union integration generally, and the negative lexicon is not generally Irish-specific.
The original provisions relating to the UK and Ireland of the Schengen Pr otocol are contained in Articles 4 and 5 thereof, which provide as follows: "4. Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which are not bound by the Schengen acquis, may at any time request to take part in some or all of the provisions of this acquis. The Council shall decide on the request with the unanimity of its members referred to in Article 1 and of the representative of the Government of the State concerned. 5... In this context, where either Ireland or the United Kingdom or both have not notified the President of the Council in writing within a reasonable period that they wish to take part, the authorisation … shall be deemed to have been granted to the Member States referred to in Article 1 and to Ireland or the United Kingdom where either of them wishes to take part in the areas of cooperation in question..."
The Commission, has perhaps unsurprisingly, expressed its support for a strictly operational and effective opt-in regime, holding rigorously to the terms of Articles 4 and 5 of the Schengen Protocol: "The Schengen Protocol integrated the Schengen acquis in the framework of the European Union: … this integration has not given rise to a renegotiation of the acquis as it was designed in the previous intergovernmental framework. The Commission's view is that there are no circumstances under which a request to participate pursuant to Article 4 could be the occasion for such a renegotiation…" 50 On the basis of Article 4 of the Schengen Protocol, the Council has adopted two decisions, one for the UK 51 and one for Ireland -the latter having applied two years later than the former to participate, a time lag that may be interpreted in various ways, as either tardy, uncertain, reflective, uncooperative or politically astute. 52 There is little evidence existing to provide a determinative view. Both countries in practice participate closely in police and judicial A Declaration on Article 4 of the Schengen Protocol was annexed to the Final Act of the Treaty of Amsterdam inviting the Council to seek the opinion of the Commission before deciding on a request, and to use their best efforts to allow the UK and Ireland if they wished to use Article 4. 54 Of course the ultimate question that remains in all matters of European Union law and policy is -to rephrase the question put by Peers -just how "ECJ proofed" could the text be? 55 The Court of Justice has recently put that question to bed in a particularly controversial decision which is considered below, and whereby the answer is that no text is unequivocally "ECJ proofed" and that the substance of the Declaration was readily capable of being overlooked. 56 The "special position" is referred to frequently throughout the text of the decisions pursuant to Articles 4 and 5 as to the place of Ireland and the UK and their unusual treatment.
However, the "special" character of the decision is adversely affected by recent judgments of the Court of Justice and is the subject of analysis in the next section. Ireland, to avail of the provisions of the Protocol and to take part in certain Schengen measures. In reality, Ireland is substantially affected by the outcome of the cases despite its peripheral place in the particular proceedings, and the two referenda campaigns in Ireland took surprisingly little interest in the decisions. Notably, at UK Cabinet level, the decision had been taken that a narrow view would be adopted of what constituted a "proposal to build upon the Schengen acquis", limiting this to proposals which amended or supplemented an existing Schengen measure, and the view had been expressed that the UK would never wish to take part in a measure to build upon a measure forming part of the Schengen acquis without first having elected to be bound by that original measure. Despite the UK's notification, it was not allowed to take part in the Regulation adopted, on the ground that it constituted a development of provisions of the Schengen acquis in which the UK did not take part. The UK then challenged the refusal to allow it to take part, alleging that the refusal constituted a breach of Article 5 of the Protocol, and that the system as set out in Article 5 was not subordinate to that established in Article 4 and was incompatible with Declaration No. 45 of the Treaty of Amsterdam on the Schengen Protocol.
Decisions of the Court of Justice on the Schengen Protocol prior to the Treaty of Lisbon changes
The Court of Justice, in a particularly controversial judgment, upheld the refusal to allow the UK to take part, and held that: "… participation of a Member State in the adoption of a measure pursuant to Article 5(1) of the Schengen Protocol is conceivable only to the extent that that State has accepted the area of the Schengen acquis which is the context of the measure or of which it is a development…" 61 The Court held that checks on persons at the external borders of the Member States had to be regarded as constituting elements of the Schengen acquis and that the Regulation constituted a measure to build upon the Schengen acquis. The Court thus held that the two articles of the Protocol could not be read independently from each other, the effectiveness rationale being of significance in its reasoning.
Another 63 whereby the UK had been excluded from participation in its application. Ireland once again supported the UK in the proceedings before the Court. 64 Again, the UK submitted that the Council had been wrong to classify the Regulation as a measure developing provisions of the Schengen acquis. The Court, similarly rejecting the claim, held that checks on persons at the external borders constituted elements of the Schengen acquis.
The Court thus held that there was no basis for a distinction to be drawn between Schengen-related and Schengen-integral measures, the effectiveness rationale or l'éffet utile, being employed here once more.
There is a widespread consensus that the decisions of the Court were unexpected and set a tone that is strangely antagonistic towards any future participation of the UK in the Schengen measures, decisions that will have repercussions for Ireland clearly. 65 They have been depicted as sending out a powerful message to the beneficiaries of generously negotiated opt-outs that that "one cannot have one's cake and eat it."
66 Notably, the judgment of the Court was delivered just a few days after the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon on 13 December 2007, containing an even more far-reaching opt-out for the UK and Ireland than that contained in the Constitutional Treaty, albeit with a softer Irish position. 67 Perhaps the Court's judgments could contribute to the UK and Ireland's integration in this part of (formerly) EC law, by confronting these Member States with the undesirable consequences of their non-participation in parts of the Schengen acquis, but the legal likelihood of this is far from apparent in the short term; and, rather, the negative interpretation is suggested here to be the more realistic one, i.e. that the "outsider" Member States will less likely join in and that constitutional differentiation will become more real and hard-edged in future times, with less opting in. 68 Irish commentators have described the decisions of the Court interpreting the UK opt-out opt-in as being both harsh and surprising and as disapproving of the UK and Irish "pick and choose" à la carte constitutional differentiation. 69 Others have suggested more benevolently that the cases did not concern the extent to which the UK could be forced to participate in a measure in which it did not want to take part, but rather the extent to which it was blocked from participating in a measure in which it did want to take part, a distinction of no small importance, that is prior to the changes effectuated by the Treaty of Lisbon.
70
Whatever view is correct, what is notable in both instances is that both the UK (and Ireland in support) sought to rely upon the Declarations attached to the Treaty relating to the Protocol, and in both instances the Court neither referred to nor appeared to take into account the Declarations in its decision. Of course, strictly speaking, Declarations are not legally binding. However, it is difficult to suggest that a purposive or teleological interpretation of a text which results in a highly exclusionary and antagonistic approach to constitutional differentiation assists with the effectiveness or éffet utile of the text. This principle is employed here as legal whitewash for the Court overtly intervening so as to thwart variable geometry taking place. Rijpma 71 asserts, it is submitted here with much force, that the decision of the Court is explicable in so far as the Court wanted to bring back the focus on the underlying rationale of the Schengen acquis, namely the free movement of European Union citizens as part of the wider single market project. Whether this will be the net result of the decision of the Court remains questionable given that the reaction to the decision seems to consider the decision to be dissuasive and discouraging to UK participation and no more. 72 72. It is suggested here that it is not unduly pessimistic to assert as Rijpma, ibid. does, that as the Court gave a very broad interpretation of the concept of "proposals and initiatives to build upon the Schengen acquis" and given that very few measures that have their legal basis in geometry has not really been much of a success nor is it likely to be in the future. 73 The strong reaction provoked by the interventionist decisions of the Court further demonstrates that constitutional differentiation is a means of understanding a compromise that is more political than legal, and the Court cannot be relied upon as a matter of law to support or sustain the political concept of constitutional differentiation.
The opt-outs and opt-ins negotiated, as set out in the Treaty of Lisbon, discussed next, appear all the more futile in the wake of the decisions of the Court.
Treaty of Lisbon and the Irish protocols and declarations employed to ratify the Treaty of Lisbon
The 2007 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) mandate and the Irish negotiating position for the Treaty of Lisbon
An opt-out from the entire Area of Freedom, Security and Justice eventually secured by the UK and Ireland in the Treaty of Lisbon, however, was not part of the failed Constitutional Treaty and at no point was such an opt-out even the subject of discussion as part of the negotiations for the Constitutional Treaty. 74 Working Group X on Freedom Security and Justice in their Final Report to the Convention on the Future of Europe had as a general concern the opt-in opt-out arrangements for the UK and Ireland. 75 Formerly, in the Constitutional Treaty, it was provided (in Protocol No. 19) thereto, that Ireland and the UK would have a range of opt-outs from policies in respect of border controls, asylum and immigration, judicial cooperation in civil matters and on police cooperation. In the lead-up to the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Irish State was publicly urged by the EU Justice Commissioner to support (former) Title IV EC will fail to qualify as a Schengen developing measure, consequently the scope of the Title IV EC Protocol has been drastically reduced. The restrictive approach of the Court here is particularly striking. Importantly, Rijpma, (ibid.) suggests that the Court's judgment casts doubt on the Council's past practice of allowing the UK and Ireland to participate under Art. 3 of the Title IV EC Protocol, for example, the ARGO programme for administrative cooperation in the fields of asylum, visa, immigration and external borders and Council Direc- justice and security policies and not to remove itself from such matters. 76 The revised Schengen Protocol does not differ substantially in its current format to that as attached to the Constitutional Treaty, rendering the (opt-in) opt-out as to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice all the more remarkable, as considered below. Efforts were made during the Finnish Presidency in 2006 to implement some of the Justice and Home Affairs communitarizing provisions of the Constitutional Treaty but these were not supported by even a bare majority of Member States. It is said that it came as a surprise to many that under the German Presidency of 2007 such rapid progress was made in creating a successor document to the Constitutional Treaty with all of the major provisions on Justice and Home Affairs which figured in the Constitutional Treaty. 77 However, the political context had altered by 2007, particularly with the advent of new leaders in the UK, France and Germany.
In the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) mandate in 2007 to "de-constitutionalize" the Constitutional Treaty, it was expressly stated that the Irish position on the scope of the Schengen Protocol and the Protocol on the position of UK and Ireland (the Title IV EC Protocol) and changes thereto would be reserved at that point in time. It provided that: "Moreover, the scope of the Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland (1997) will be extended so as to include, in relation to the UK, and on the same terms, the Chapters on judicial cooperation in criminal matters and on police cooperation. It may also address the application of the Protocol in relation to Schengen building measures and amendments to existing measures. This extension will take account of the UK's position nder the previously existing Union acquis in these areas. Ireland will determine in due course its position with regard to that extension." It is hard to attribute or relate such motivations to the Irish position to the same degree and they certainly do not receive official recognition during this period in the Irish media nor in the scholarship generally.
82 Remarkably, at the same time as Ireland obtained such a far-reaching opt out from the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the Treaty of Lisbon, the Danish Government set out plans to hold a referendum on the Danish opt-outs in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, ultimately abandoned, but nonetheless demonstrating that the isolationist stance of the Danish, interpreted far beyond that intended, was increasingly viewed with unease both at home and abroad. 83 The next issue for consideration is the revisions to the Schengen Protocol after the Treaty of Lisbon, specific to Ireland and the UK.
The revised Schengen Protocol after Lisbon
The most significant of the minor revisions to the Schengen Protocol (Protocol No. 19) made by the Treaty of Lisbon, is a substantially more detailed Article 5, according more freedom to the UK and Ireland to opt-in or remain outside with increased flexibility. 84 There was much confusion domestically as to whether the position negotiated amounted to more of an opt-out than an optout opt-in. 85 It must be noted that the language surrounding the revised procedures for opting-in is more conciliatory in tone than the recent decisions of the Court of Justice might have suggested, discussed above. Article 5(3) thereof encourages the "widest possible participation" of the UK and Ireland ensuring operability whilst "respecting coherence." 86 The new right set out in Article 5 entails that the UK and Ireland may opt-out of measures building upon the Schengen acquis which they have already opted-out from. This creates a degree of circularity in the sense that the recent decisions of the Court of Justice only refused an entitlement to opt-in to building measures. And so now there is an express right to opt-out of building measures (subject to a strict interpretation of "building" because of the decision of the Court) where there was an opt-out from those Schengen acquis provisions that the measures sought to build upon. However, the prospective coherence of such an opt-out is now a legally relevant factor as noted above -an issue of importance in light of the decision of the Court and one readily inviting litigation. Notably, Article 7 now provides that for the purposes of negotiations for the admission of new Member States, the Schengen acquis and further measures taken by the institutions within its scope shall be regarded as an acquis which must be accepted in full by all States candidates for admission. Thus the Irish and UK positions must be regarded as peculiarly anomalous given this non-negotiability for candidate States.
Peers has asserted that the UK has been particularly cooperative in respect of the operation of the Protocol opt-in to date and also that other States have assisted with a smooth and non-antagonistic attitude to the operation of the Protocol. 87 Ireland must also be interpreted as co-operating less actively and 84. House of Lords Select Committee on European Union, cited supra note 40. 85. Smyth, op. cit. supra note 81. 86. Similar to Art. 4a of the Protocol on the position of the UK and Ireland as to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (after Lisbon) discussed infra, but without financial penalty to the same extent, the latter being dealt with in a Declaration, discussed below. See House of Lords Select Committee on European Union, cited supra note 40, para 6.281. Declaration No. 47 provides that the UK and Ireland shall bear the direct financial consequences, if any, necessarily and unavoidably incurred as a result of the cessation of their participation in some or all of the acquis.
87. Peers, op. cit. supra note 51, 6, who states that inclusion rather than exclusion has been fostered through successful cooperation amongst those inside and outside the Protocol. Arguably then, this context renders the content of the revised Protocol and Declaration all the more difficult to assess, given the climate of antagonism and separateness that the provisions outline. Peers suggests that there has been no case where, after the UK or Ireland opted into a proposal, they blocked agreement on that proposal resulting in the other Member States going ahead without less proactively, as the discussion above in section 4.2 indicates as to its opting-in actions and the timing thereof to date. Wiener contended less than a decade ago that the British "no" to Schengen had been substantial in its contribution towards forging flexibility as a constitutional principle in the European polity, thereby demonstrating how the Schengen process, as constitutionally divisive as it might appear, has in fact contributed to further European integration. 88 However, a decade later, if this in fact were the case, surely the Court would not have delivered the decisions that it did recently and the flexibility of the arrangements now existing would be unnecessary. 90 While viewed as increased flexibility from a UK perspective, 91 when read with the opt-ins negotiated from an Irish perspective, these provisions arguably amount to further isolation on the basis that Ireland will avail itself less often of the provisions than the UK, if history is to be judged correctly, and never proactively. The reasons commonly asserted for the need for such an opt-out relate firstly, to the Common Travel Area shared by Ireland with the UK and secondly, the common law tradition shared by a small minority of States within the European Union, a tradition that is them, suggesting that the UK Home Office is particularly keen to avoid this ever happening, and that so far it has succeeded.
88 asserted to require special treatment in this regard. 92 However, neither reason represents an absolute barrier to change. Notably, Ireland has been asked in recent times to join the Schengen Area. 93 The disadvantages of this position for Ireland are patently that it has no voice or voting rights. On the contrary, however, the Irish Oireachtas Joint Committee on European Affairs issued a statement in 2008 declaring that the opt-out opt-in position negotiated would ultimately protect Ireland's legal system. 94 As for the specific terms of the Protocol, the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 of the Protocol provide for the practical operation of the opt-in procedure, while Article 4a provides for penalties for the financial consequences of nonparticipation, to the detriment of the States seeking to avail of constitutional flexibility. Notably, the Council may urge the UK or Ireland to participate where they are not participating, which as Peers optimistically suggests, may operate as an incentive to opt-in and also co-extensively give the UK and Ireland an opportunity to rid themselves of obligations. 95 It remains plausible, however, that this provision could result in a serious political incident or at least a damaging battle against isolation, and that the UK would be more likely to offload obligations than Ireland. Ireland would be in great danger of serious isolation if it chose not to remain wedded to the UK in such a situation. Moreover, the possibility for incoherence is great, if for example, a measure such as the European arrest warrant is amended. 96 It is not inconceivable that the UK or Ireland could be ejected from the European arrest warrant in the event of the States not participating in a building measure, with the result that the existing system is found inoperable by the remainder of States.
97 Article 4a is suggested to be a veritable double-edged sword, although the accuracy of the weaponry metaphors depends much on political will in the future. Importantly, a decision on "inoperability" would be amenable to review before the Court of Justice.
98 Perhaps, of course, the real effect of these ambiguities will be limited and the uncertainties surrounding the Irish and UK (and Danish) positions in the field may not materialize as a result of careful political management. In neither Ireland nor the UK is there any systematic parliamentary scrutiny of a decision to opt-in to a particular measure under this Protocol, although the House of Lords has recently made efforts to redress this. 99 When viewed overall, the opt-in mechanism in the Protocol does not necessarily neutralize the impact of the extensive opt-outs obtained, given the practical difficulties involved in opting-in.
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Of much importance, then, in light of the above, pursuant to Article 8 of the Protocol, 101 Ireland may notify the Council that it no longer wishes to be covered by the terms of the Protocol. As will be explained below, then the normal Treaty provisions will apply to Ireland by way of parliamentary ratification only and not by referendum. Article 8, however, has to be construed along with Declaration (No. 56) annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon such that the position of Ireland is subject to review in three years time, i.e. in late 2012.
102 This is not without its own complications, from the point of view of domestic constitutional law, considered below.
103 Hinarejos adverts to arguments made against the Lisbon Treaty in recent times which included assertions that it was not a solution to any pressing problem but rather an unnecessary step that would pose problems of its own. 104 It is suggested here that the breadth of the Protocol as to Ireland and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is also accurately captured by this comment.
Related to this Protocol then is a Declaration negotiated by Ireland covering the terms of its opt-out and opt-in, discussed here next. The temporal period set out in this Declaration is of tremendous importance for two specific reasons. Firstly, there is the complication that another referendum will not ostensibly be required as a matter of domestic constitutional law in three years' time in the event that a positive decision is taken to participate in this corpus of law, as provision was made for this in the amendment to ratify the Treaty, as set out above. However, if this parliamentary ratification could take place in isolation without a review of the Common Travel Area, it remains a matter of no small importance, considered below in more detail given its implications. Secondly, in so far as there is a five-year time lag prior to the Court of Justice gaining jurisdiction over the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 107 this occurs simultaneously with the Transitional Provisions as to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice as to the UK becoming operative, discussed next, whereby the UK gains breathing space to reconsider the implications of the ending of the five-year Transitional Provisions during which time the Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction. Thus the three-year period might more appropriately have been drafted as a five-year period. The UK "wait and see" provisions are, of course, politically explicable, but as a matter of law, lack rationality and coherence, which embodies in one sense constitutional differentiation but in another, empties the substance thereof.
The significance of the final "Irish" provisions -i.e. Article 8 of the Protocol on the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and abovementioned Declaration, are far from negligible. Ireland appears to stand in a default position of absolute exclusion subject to a position of possible participation. The combined impact of the Protocol, Declaration and Transitional Provisions (notwithstanding that the latter do not apply as such to Ireland but ultimately will have some bearing on the reality of the Irish position), is a sprawling mishmash of inexplicable separateness and the potentiality for inclusion. While the possibilities for differentiation enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon are unparalleled in the history of the European Union project, their impacts are unique to Ireland and the UK, arguably partially "going Danish," i.e. replicating the tenuous Danish position to date, which itself is under review. Their peculiarity surely entails that there is a high likelihood that the Court will consider their content in the near future. 108 The overall stance adopted both legally and politically by Ireland appears thus to be in the realm of the constitutional chameleon, as far as is optically and legally possible.
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A related Protocol which affects the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is next considered here.
Protocol (No. 36) on Transitional Provisions
Protocol (No. 36) on Transitional Provisions attached to the Treaty of Lisbon sets out a temporal menu of considerable complexity which is designed to govern the period of time between the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and the end of its extended introductory period, the duration of which is 108. Fletcher, op. cit. supra note 8, at 97. 109. One of the most striking features of the Treaty of Lisbon must surely be the plethora of Protocols and Declarations attached thereto. The sheer number of Declarations annexed to the Final Act of the Treaty of Lisbon, at 65, adopted by either the Member States or the Inter-Governmental Conference, is quite significant and not since the Treaty on the European Union have so many detailed legal descriptors been attached to the Treaties. Clearly, Declarations often reflect matters of great national but not necessarily European interest and frequently dwell on veritably parochial causes that do not garner wider support. The value that the Court of Justice places on such instruments is less than predictable, as the decision discussed in Section 5 suggests.
governed by these provisions. While the provisions concerning the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the main affect the UK, Ireland is also affected in a significant fashion. Most notable are the provisions pertaining to the present discussion, namely to Titles V and VI TEU prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. Articles 10(1) and (3) of the Protocol provide for a fiveyear transitional period during which the Court of Justice does not enjoy jurisdiction over the newly "communitarized" Area of Freedom, Security and Justice nor does the Commission enjoy its powers to institute infringement proceedings against States during this period. Article 10(4) arguably contains the most striking and indulgent of all of the opt-outs conceded to the UK, whereby the UK is permitted six months prior to the expiry of the Transitional Period, to declare that it does not accept the end of the Transitional Period in respect of non-amended measures that have not been converted from Third Pillar to First Pillar status by then, an unqualified right. 110 Financial penalties also attach pursuant to Article 10(4) for the direct financial consequences of cessation of its participation. The UK thus has an unprecedented right to leave en bloc all Third Pillar (police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters) acquis not meanwhile amended or replaced, which may obviously entail a cost to the Union given that UK withdrawal would require the measure to be amended. These provisions have elicited forceful reactions: "… they are to be deplored, for their complexity, for their potential torpedoing of ambitious legislative initiatives, and … for the symbolic message of the precedent: for the first time, an EU treaty allows a Member State to withdraw from existing acquis."
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Fletcher rightly contends that Article 10 presents a much greater danger to the coherence of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice than does the Protocol on the position of the UK and Ireland as to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and it is difficult to disagree. 112 The rationale for the provisions arguably related to the desire of the British Government to avoid holding a referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon, through emphasis on the differences between the Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon. 113 The provisions are thus overtly political and stretch the limits of constitutional differentiation. Importantly, the Irish State did not avail of such mechanisms and the period after the transition time frame could bring legal complexities of Byzantine proportions for Ireland. How will Ireland be affected by the "UK exclusion zone," in the event that the UK does not accept "communitarization" at the end or near-end of the transitional period? For example, what system would be established to replace the European arrest warrant as between Ireland and the UK, where the need for a common system between the two countries has generated a vast corpus of law as to extradition and now in respect of surrender under the new system? The jurisprudence as to the European arrest warrant would become mired in complexity if the UK Supreme Court (which has taken over the role of the House of Lords), the supreme court of a common law country from which Ireland has traditionally drawn much of its inspiration for criminal law legislation as well as the inspiration of the legislation incorporating the ECHR, were to deliver judgments ordinarily persuasive but suddenly of no relevance? It would appear that the complexity of the provisions is detrimental both to the coherence of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the future and potentially to the interests of Ireland. The above analysis completes the sectional analysis of the Irish-related Protocols and Declarations as contained in the Treaty of Lisbon. Subsequent to the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon, a referendum resulted in further Irish-specific legal provisions being required to be passed so as to ratify the Treaty of Lisbon and these events and provisions are considered here next.
After the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007: What happened next
Thus in 2008, in the first Treaty referendum, the Irish electorate rejected the Treaty of Lisbon for reasons adverted to earlier, shortly after a new Taoiseach (Prime Minister) came to power. 114 A period of reflection ensued, which coincided with a global economic recession, a severe downturn in the Irish economy as well as unprecedented unpopularity of the Irish Government. Extensive Government research was commissioned so as to explain the negative vote. number of limited and generalized recommendations. 116 By the time the second Treaty of Lisbon referendum took place, a party founded principally to oppose the Treaty of Lisbon, Libertas, disintegrated following an abysmal performance in the MEP elections in 2009. 117 For the second referendum, the State's broadcasting rules were amended so as to facilitate the reality of the politics governing the referendum campaign, where all the major political parties supported the Government in their desire to procure a successful referendum result. 118 Previously, broadcasters had been obliged to provide equal airtime to those campaigning for and against the Treaty referendum result, despite the weight of elected representatives and campaigners in favour of the Treaty. This change was most significant in facilitating a positive referendum result.
The Lisbon II guarantees provided to Ireland in 2009
As a measure to assist the Irish Government with the prospect of a second referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon, the concerns of the Irish people voting in Lisbon I were taken cognizance of in the form of Irish-specific legal guarantees or more formally, a Decision of the Heads of State or Government of the 27 Member States in 2009 meeting within the European Council. 119 This formula was adopted so as to ensure as a matter of law and for domestic political purposes that the decision was a legally binding one, but also that it did not require the Treaty of Lisbon to be renegotiated. In this regard, the pressures brought to bear by the British Government were significant. 120 Three specific guarantees were provided in total to the Irish State -a Decision, a Declaration of the European Council and a Declaration by the Irish State. The formula employed a Solemn Declaration on Workers Rights, as the British Government would not allow the Government to obtain a Protocol referencing workers rights, for fear that they would be interpreted as obtaining a less effective deal for their electorate. 121 The concerns addressed by the guarantees include the right to life, family, education, taxation, security and defence and the subjects (in all except education) reflect the findings of the Government commissioned researched in to the negative first Treaty of Lisbon vote in 2008. 122 The formula set out in the guarantees, as to the various subjects and their expressed compatibility as a matter of Irish constitutional law with the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon, retains a solidly domestic flavour to it, reflecting the genesis of the Treaty of Lisbon I campaign, where serious fears were publicly raised by influential members of society as to the likelihood of the detention of threeyear-olds pursuant to the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, despite the groundlessness of these claims.
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The Decision taken in 2009 by the Heads of State or Government expresses itself to be legally binding in a particularly explicitly fashion. 124 The formula is also expressed to be subject to a promise or expectation, as a matter of law, that the decision will become a Protocol to the Treaties at the next Accession Treaty. The necessity of a dual reference to it being a legally binding decision and a prospective Protocol has been openly questioned by the British Government. 125 Peers has suggested that there is no conflict between the Decision and the Treaties, and most commentators assert a similar position or in fact that the guarantees substantially ameliorate existing domestic constitutional protections. 126 So as to stall the successful ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, a suggestion was made that the Czech Republic could be denied a Commissioner in the next Commission on account of the legal position currently subsisting as to the composition of the Commission. 127 Otherwise, the guarantees although influenced to a degree by Irish-British relations, do not appear to have been significantly affected by these relations. Clearly, the guarantees had to relate to Irish-specific interests. Notably, the research did not suggest broader concerns or issues relating to the Common Travel Area, the Schengen Area Protocol or the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.
In light of the above analysis as a matter of European Union law as to Irish specific instruments used to ratify the Treaty of Lisbon, an account of the domestic constitutional provisions of relevance to ratification follows for completeness' sake.
Domestic constitutional provisions passed so as to ratify the Treaty of Lisbon
The Twenty-Eighth Amendment to the Constitution (Treaty of Lisbon) Act, 2009 was enacted to amend domestic constitutional provisions relating to European Union affairs and thus ratify the Treaty of Lisbon. 128 The key amendments are made to the existing provisions of Article 29 of the Constitution dealing with European Union affairs and the subject of amendment with each Treaty, to paragraph 4 thereof. A fuller analysis of these provisions is outside the scope of this work, and one provision is selected here for examination. including the option that the said Protocol No. 21 shall, in whole or in part, cease to apply to the State, but any such exercise shall be subject to the prior approval of both Houses of the Oireachtas."
Parliamentary approval and opt-ing in
Mere parliamentary approval is then needed to opt in pursuant to Article 8 of the Protocol, as a matter of domestic law. 129 This falls short of a possibly more rigorous and systematic approach, such as that being contemplated in the UK at the time of writing. 130 The European Union Act 2009, which amends Irish statutory law to incorporate the enhanced role for national parliaments as to the new Protocol on subsidiarity as contained in the Treaty of Lisbon, is equally devoid of any system to deal with the implications of Article 4a noted above (financial implications of non-participation) or the remainder of the Protocol. 131 This type of "advance parliamentary approval" has its origins in Ireland in the constitutional amendments passed to deal with the variable geometry provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam, in Article 29 of the Constitution also.
132 This represented, domestically at least, an important development and a more effective (and cost effective) means of dealing with the complexities of European Law developments, arguably more so than a referendum.
It could be contended that the constitutional amendments made recently authorizing the State, by way of parliamentary authority only, to elect to opt into the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, pursuant to the terms of the relevant Protocol or to join the Schengen Area, are unduly straightforward or simplistic. The difficulty with the simplicity of the constitutional provision drafted is that is fails to enumerate other related issues arising in the event of the State exercising such choices. For example, the three-year review set out in Declaration (No. 56), considered above, would take place ahead of the fiveyear transition period to accept the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice and the five-year lead-in period for the UK to accept communitarized Third Pillar acts. The Irish Government could of course, for political reasons, in three years time elect to have a referendum for Ireland to opt-in or not to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice or the Schengen acquis, but arguably it would not have to hold such a referendum as the strict wording of the constitutional amendment 131. Practice suggests that Irish MEPs do not vote in the plenary where Ireland has not opted into a measure: see generally House of Lords Select Committee on European Union, cited supra note 40. This, arguably, is a worrisome development in the long term, particularly if Ireland reviews its opt-out in the future, as per the terms of Declaration (No. 56) considered above.
132. See formerly Arts. 29.4.6 and 29.4.8, the Eighteenth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments to the Constitution respectively. passed does not provide for this; on the contrary, simple parliamentary approval is required. The timing thereof appears temporally ill-judged in light of the ramifications for Ireland of the UK exercising opt-out rights after the five-year period.
Opting-in: Constitutional difficulties?
It is submitted here that the Common Travel Area would need to be reviewed in the event of Ireland electing to opt-in to the Schengen Agreement pursuant to the terms of Article 29.4.7° and Protocol No. 21. Ostensibly, of course, no domestic constitutional law issue arises, as the Common Travel Area has its basis originally in administrative measures and not in the Constitution. 133 Only in 1997 did the Common Travel Area receive mention as a matter of European Union law, pursuant to the Amsterdam Protocols on Schengen and Article 14 EC. It could be asserted that the removal of the Common Travel Area would result in a loss of national sovereignty warranting a referendum within the meaning of existing Supreme Court jurisprudence governing European Union law affairs, 134 on account of the provisions of the Constitution modified after the Good Friday Agreement according citizenship to those born on the Island of Ireland and the assertions of unity of the people North and South of the Island. 135 The Common Travel Area is a privilege, but its removal could adversely impact on the free movement rights of citizens of Northern Ireland electing to obtain Irish citizenship. Arguably, a more concrete legal basis would need to be ring-fenced as to British-Irish relations given the terms of the Irish Constitution if the Common Travel Area were amended. 133 . See supra, section 3. 134. The Supreme Court decision in Crotty v. An Taoiseach, [1987] I.R. 713 has entailed that a referendum on European Treaty ratification has been held consistently since that decision, which decided that a Treaty had to be submitted by referendum to the people where a proposed Treaty altered the scope and objectives of the Union such that the initial popular consent to European Union membership had been exceeded.
135. See Arts. 2, 3 and 9 of the Irish Constitution. Art. 9 now provides that: "1. 1° On the coming into operation of this Constitution any person who was a citizen of Saorstát Éireann immediately before the coming into operation of this Constitution shall become and be a citizen of Ireland.
2° The future acquisition and loss of Irish nationality and citizenship shall be determined in accordance with law… 2. 1° Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, a person born in the island of Ireland, which includes its islands and seas, who does not have, at the time of the birth of that person, at least one parent who is an Irish citizen or entitled to be an Irish citizen is not entitled to Irish citizenship or nationality, unless provided for by law.
2° This section shall not apply to persons born before the date of the enactment of this section…"
In sum, the amendments made to the Irish Constitution are in the main minimalist. However, the opt-in provisions raise several issues of immense complexity and the efforts made to simplify the position of the State may not be so easily realized, given the range of variables surrounding those choices to be exercised by other actors.
Conclusion
Ireland is politically not at the heart of European affairs, although the Irish State does not attract the same "Euro-sceptic" labels as its closest neighbour. There remains a complex interaction between the Irish and British States in matters of law and politics. The Common Travel Area is historically the legal and political basis for Irish-European policy positions as to the Schengen Area and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. However, the Common Travel Area reflects the deep-seated complexities of the entity that is the "IrishBritish-European" relationship. Water borders are only a minimal element of the factual matrix of these relations and yet in many accounts they appear as the most critical one. The extent to which the Court of Justice in its two decisions in 2007 upset the purpose of the Schengen Protocol special arrangements is most remarkable, but ultimately did not deter Ireland and the UK from extending further the limits of constitutional differentiation in the Treaty of Lisbon. The Schengen Protocol "special arrangements" for the UK and Ireland have not been well received by commentators or the Court of Justice, serving often to show their futility. The breadth of the recent opt-outs obtained by Ireland seems difficult to understand given the separateness that they encourage and is explicable only to the extent that they support a commonality of "Irish-British-European" relations. It has been argued here that increased constitutional flexibility accorded to Ireland and the UK in the Treaty of Lisbon appears legally disproportionate to its effectiveness as a matter of EU law. Major complexities surround the operation of Declaration (No. 56) and the Protocols and the simplicity of the relevant domestic constitutional law provisions remains problematic, as does the absence of mention of the Common Travel Area in Irish constitutional law. Notably the research conducted to investigate the negative Lisbon referendum result in Ireland did not uncover any sentiments as to "Irish-British-European" relations.
It might take an especially brave Court of Justice to overlook or defy the peculiarities of the Protocols and Declarations negotiated by Ireland (and the UK) in the Treaty of Lisbon. Far from the claims of Wiener over a decade ago that differentiated State behaviour and opt-outs gave rise to an effective principle of constitutional differentiation, the reality instead is a bleak mismatch of incoherence. Curtin's "Europe of bits and pieces" 136 perhaps has been remedied to a degree, Treaty by Treaty and with patchily significant interventions on the part of the Court of Justice. However, the "bits and pieces" of the Irishspecific opt-outs have increased in scale and in direction. The matrix comprising European Union law, national law, the Protocols and Declarations and the complex beast of "Irish-British-European" relations, conjointly has yet to receive any consideration by the Court of Justice. Its incoherence and complexity may not be fully "ECJ proofed" but equally nor is it ever likely to be so. 136 . Curtin, "The constitutional structure of the Union: A Europe of bits and pieces", 30 CML Rev. (1993), 17.
